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BETWEEN  THE  MIDDLE  OF  MAY and early July of 1973,  the price  of the 
dollar  in the foreign  exchange  market  fell sharply.  The amount  of the de- 
cline was greatly  exaggerated  by some reporters,  who cited figures  of 25 
percent  or more,  which  really  measured  only the dramatic  decline  against 
the German  mark,  the Swiss  franc,  or an average  of a few European  cur- 
rencies.  The fall against  an average  of the currencies  of the major U.S. 
trading  partners  was  much  less-6.3  percent,  when  each  country  is weighted 
in proportion  to its bilateral  trade  with the United States.  The dollar  re- 
mained  stable against  the currencies  of our two major  trading  partners, 
Canada  and Japan,  and also against  those of the United Kingdom  and 
Italy.  Even  this smaller  average  decline,  however,  presents  something  of a 
mystery,  coming  as it did after  the dollar  had been devalued  on February 
12, 1973,  for the second  time in fourteen  months, and when people  who 
follow these  matters  generally  held that it was, if anything,  already  below 
its long-run  equilibrium  value. 
Explanations  Suggested  by Others 
Many  explanations  of this weakness  have  been offered.  Nobody knows 
their  relative  importance  or even  whether  some  have  any  importance  at all, 
but a catalogue  of plausible  reasons  may be of interest. 
At the outset, it may be pointed out that, contrary  to a widely held 
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opinion,  the decline  of the dollar,  like the fall of any other  price,  does not 
necessarily  imply  that  net private  sales  of dollars  substantially  increased  or 
that purchases  other  than by monetary  authorities  dropped.  If would-be 
buyers  and  would-be  sellers  of the dollar  (or anything  else)  simultaneously 
change  their opinions  as to what it is worth,  its price  can change  in the 
absence  of any transaction.  Such a change  is commonly  referred  to as a 
"marking  up" or "marking  down."  While it is very unlikely  in practice, 
something  approaching  it may occur when everyone  hears of an event 
simultaneously  and interprets  its significance  for the commodity  in ques- 
tion in the same  way. Something  like that  evidently  operated  in the case of 
the dollar,  for  there  was  apparently  no net outflow  of private  capital  during 
the second  quarter  of 1973.  The preliminary  figures,  in fact, indicate  that 
the net flow was inward. 
In view of the widespread  opinion  that the dollar  was "undervalued" 
after the February  devaluation,  its subsequent  weakness  in the foreign 
exchange  market  requires  explanation,  for the usual meaning  of "under- 
valuation"  is that the commodity  in question  is likely to rise in price,  so 
that people  who believe  it to be undervalued  would  presumably  buy it in 
anticipation  of that  rise,  thereby  bringing  the rise  about.  I shall  review  the 
many  reasons  given  for  the dollar's  decline  from  early  May  to July,  and  try 
to reconcile  that decline  with  the belief  that the dollar  was already  under- 
valued  before  that decline  began. 
1. One  of the  most  common  explanations  is that  price  rises  in the United 
States  accelerated  rapidly  after  the beginning  of 1973.  Price  increases  not 
caused  by increases  in foreign  demand  always  tend  to weaken  the value  of 
a currency  in the foreign  exchange  market,  especially  if they  are  more  rapid 
than  those  in competing  countries,  because  they  are  likely  to foreshadow  a 
loss of exports  and an increase  of imports.  The acceleration  of the U.S. 
price  rise  during  the winter  and  spring  of 1973  was  not limited  to exportable 
farm  products  and would probably  have weakened  the foreign  exchange 
value  of the  dollar  even  had  it not been  more  rapid  than  that  abroad,  if only 
because  it reversed  a previous  slowing  of the inflationary  movement  and 
thereby  suggested  a weakening  in effective  control  by the government  and 
the possibility  of further  acceleration. 
2. Simultaneously  with the acceleration  in the rate of price  rise in the 
United States, monetary  policies in some European  countries,  notably 
Germany,  were  tightened  and  interest  rates  in most  of them  rose.  Although 
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Table 1.  Relation of German  and U.S. Interest Rates, March-August 1973 
Percent 
Representative  money  market  rates  Domestic  corporate  bond  yields 
At or  Excess of  Excess of 
near end  United  Germani  United  German 
of month  Germany  States  rates  Germany  States  yields 
March  9.50  7.10  2.40  8.83  7.60  1.23 
April  12.50  7.22  5.28  9.26  7.50  1.76 
May  12.63  7.75  4.88  10.45  7.64  2.81 
June  14.00  8.54  5.46  9.82  7.90  1.92 
July  14.50  10.13  4.37  10.99  8.42  2.57 
August  13.75  10.93  2.82  10.28  8.13  2.15 
Source: Morgan Guaranty  Trust  Company of New York, World  Financial Markets, September 18, 1973, 
pp. 17, 20. 
insulate  the deutsche  mark  from this development,  these controls  can at 
best restrain  such inflows.  For one thing, they do not prevent  Germans 
who have  invested  abroad  from  bringing  their  capital  home. Second,  they 
do not prevent  increases  of commercial  credits  in the form  of the so-called 
leads and lags-that  is, increasingly  early  payments  for German  exports 
and increasingly  delayed  payments  by Germans  for their  imports,  which, 
on given  expectations  about  future  changes  in the mark,  are  influenced  to 
some  degree  by the difference  between  interest  rates  in Germany  and other 
countries. 
The relation  between  interest  rates in the United States  and Germany 
before  and during  the months of 1973  in question  is shown in Table 1. 
3. Furthermore,  Germany  showed  its determination  to suppress  its price 
rise  to the maximum  extent  possible  by adopting  a tighter  fiscal  policy.  On 
May  9, it announced  increases  in taxation,  curtailment  of planned  govern- 
ment  expenditures,  and  other  measures  to reinforce  the  restrictive  monetary 
policy adopted  in February.  Other countries  also intensified  their anti- 
inflationary  monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  which  may  have  been  expected  to 
check  both their  demand  for imports  and  the deterioration  of the competi- 
tive position  of their  exports. 
4. The sensational  revelations  precipitated  by the Watergate  break-in 
and the publicity  given  to other  actions  associated  with the White  House 
raised  serious  questions  in the minds  of many  asset  holders  about  the abil- 
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carry  out effective  policies  to combat  inflation.  This  was  unquestionably  an 
influence,  and continues  to be. 
5. Related  to this influence  but also partly  independent  of it is a fear 
that,  under  any circumstances,  the recent  rapid  rise  of prices  in the United 
States  will end in a severe  credit  squeeze  followed  by a recession.  A reces- 
sion would  normally  be regarded  as strengthening  the net U.S. trade  posi- 
tion, both by restraining  business  activity  and thereby  U.S. imports  and 
by restraining  domestic demand for exportable  goods and thereby  en- 
couraging  exports,  but it also tends to make investment  in the United 
States,  especially  in common  stocks,  much  less attractive  to foreigners. 
6. Also tending  to weaken  the dollar  was the fact that  just when  a huge 
increase  in foreign  demand  for U.S. agricultural  products  was  contributing 
greatly  to an improvement  in the trade  balance,  the United States  limited 
exports  of soybeans,  cottonseed,  and related  products,  and also of scrap 
metals.  The imposition  of the first  export  controls  was regarded  as a set- 
back  for  trade  improvement,  and  the subsequent  controls-made necessary 
by shifts  of foreign  demand  into commodities  substitutable  for those sub- 
ject to the first  set-clouded still  further  the prospect  for improvement  and 
consequently  for an increase  in the demand  for dollars. 
7. Another  adverse  factor  in the long-run  outlook  for the dollar  was  the 
suddenly  emerging  and much publicized  prospect  that the United States 
would  have  to expand  vastly  its imports  of oil and  gas.  Increases  from  some 
$5 billion  in 1972  to between  $11 billion and $15 billion  by 1975,  and to 
$25 billion-even $35 billion-by  1985,  have  been talked  about. 
8. During  May and June,  the Japanese  monetary  authorities  sold over 
$1.6 billion  of foreign  exchange  reserves  to keep  the yen up in the face of 
their  payments  deficit.  These  sales,  however,  were  smaller  than  those  made 
during  March  and April,  which  amounted  to about $2.3 billion. 
9. Superimposed  on these  considerations  was  the rise  in the price  of gold 
in private  markets.  If this rise  had been  no greater  than  that in some  aver- 
age of the prices  of foreign  currencies,  it would  have reflected  merely  the 
decline  in the value  of the dollar.  But  the price  rose  in foreign  currencies  as 
well. In general,  a rise  in the price  of gold is more  likely  to be an effect  of 
distrust  of the dollar  than a cause,  but it is to some  extent  also a cause.  It 
has been attributed  to a distrust  of all currencies,  resulting  in a movement 
from  assets  denominated  in currencies  into gold itself  (where  its ownership 
is permitted),  and  to a revival  of speculation  that  gold might  be restored  to 
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ment  out of currencies  into gold, while  raising  the price  of gold  in relation 
to all currencies,  could  not affect  the relation  between  the dollar  and other 
currencies.  This is not the case, however.  Even if asset holders  wanted  to 
convert  into gold the same  percentage  of assets  held  in every  currency,  the 
absolute  quantity  of assets  denominated  in dollars  is so much  larger  than 
that  in other  currencies  that  the volume  of dollars  offered  might  be greater 
than the volume  of other  currencies.  Even apart  from this consideration, 
the relative,  as well as the absolute,  movement  out of dollars  clearly  would 
be greatest  of all the currencies.  One  reason  is that  the recent  experience  of 
dollar  holders  has been  less happy  than  that of holders  of other  currencies. 
In this connection,  it is hard to avoid the conclusion,  even if only in 
retrospect,  that the second  devaluation  of the dollar  was very  damaging  to 
the desire  to hold dollars.  Because  it was quite  unexpected,  it must  inevita- 
bly have raised  the fear  that it could  happen  again,  especially  since  it was 
medicine  that  the U.S. Treasury  appeared  to enjoy  taking.  One  investment 
adviser  who believed  that  the dollar  was  undervalued  explained  that  he did 
not recommend  purchase  of dollars  because, having thought  the dollar 
already  cheap  before  the second  devaluation  and having  persuaded  clients 
to buy dollar-denominated  assets,  he had  made  a mistake  that  proved  very 
costly to them.  Although  his conviction  that the dollar  was undervalued 
was  even  stronger  after  the  second  devaluation  than  before  it, his  confidence 
in his own  judgment  was  naturally  shaken.  Many  others  must  have  felt the 
same  way. The second  devaluation  appeared  to be quite arbitrary;  if the 
dollar  could  be devalued  arbitrarily  once, it could  be again.  This response 
to it, moreover,  was reinforced  by the U.S. government's  declaration  at 
the same  time  that  it intended  to end the controls  over  the outflow  of cap- 
ital and to refrain  from market  support  of the dollar,  and by its implied 
intention  to impose  only moderate  restraint  on demand. 
This is an impressive  list of reasons  for the dollar's  weakness.  All of 
them have some, and several  have much, plausibility.  Nevertheless,  it is 
hard  to reconcile  any but the last one with the widespread  view that the 
dollar  is undervalued.  With one-year  money available  in some European 
countries  at 7 percent  to prime  borrowers  and probably  8 percent  to other 
good borrowers,  one would  suppose  that anyone  confident  that the dollar 
would  rise  in the course  of a year  would  have borrowed  foreign  currency, 
bought  dollars,  and invested  in U.S. Treasury  bills at the then available 
yield  of 7 '/: or 8 percent,  expecting  to be able  to pay  off  his  loan a year  later 
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would  have  expected  a movement  of capital  into the United  States  so long 
as the expected  rise in the price  of the dollar  was greater  than any excess 
of foreign  interest  rates  to borrowers  over  the interest  rates  obtainable  by 
lenders  in the United  States.  Since  that  excess  was no more  than 2 percent 
in any European  country  except  Germany  and by late spring  the dollar 
appeared  to have been widely regarded  as undervalued  by significantly 
more than that amount,  the absence  of a flow of capital  into the United 
States  is hard to  reconcile  with the belief in a substantial  undervalua- 
tion. 
One  explanation  is that  the  fall of the dollar  has  been  greatly  exaggerated 
by the publicity  given  to its movement  in relation  to the major  European 
currencies.  As I have  noted  above,  the dollar  fell  little  during  the May-July 
period  in relation  to the Canadian  dollar  and did not fall at all in relation 
to the Japanese  yen-and Canada  and  Japan  together  account  for some  40 
percent  of U.S. trade.  It fell by only about 4 percent  against  the pound 
sterling.  Given these facts, an interpretation  suggesting  that the seven 
European  currencies  participating  in the joint float rose against  the rest 
of the world  appears  more  accurate  than one that suggests  that the dollar 
fell in relation  to all other  currencies  when it and many other  currencies 
of major  traders  fell in relation  to the seven. This point was forcefully 
made by the Morgan  Guaranty  Trust Company  in its World  Financial 
Markets  (issue of June 19, 1973, p. 2), which concluded,  "The recent 
exchange-market  events  should  not be described  as a run on the dollar." 
Measuring  the decline  of the dollar  against  an average  of the major  cur- 
rencies,  with  each  currency  weighted  by bilateral  trade  of the issuing  coun- 
try with the United States,  the Morgan  Guaranty  Trust  Company  calcu- 
lated that the dollar  declined  by about 3 percent  during  May. The total 
decline  against  this average  of foreign  currencies,  from early  May to the 
low point in early  July,  was approximately  6.3 percent,  according  to their 
calculations. 
Even  though  the fall of the dollar  was  less severe  than  the headlines  dur- 
ing the spring  suggested,  it was substantial.  Moreover,  the view that the 
dollar  was  undervalued  was  certainly  widespread  by the beginning  of June, 
if not before,  yet it continued  to fall. Since  July,  there  has been  a recovery, 
but as of mid-August  it accounted  for only  about  half  of the May-July  loss. 
Moreover,  as was announced  in September,  the dollar  was supported  in 
July  by approximately  $575 million of purchases  by the Federal  Reserve 
System  and the German  Bundesbank,  indicating  that even this partial  re- Walter  S. Salant  487 
covery  was not accomplished  by private  market  forces,  at least not alone. 
In short,  something  remains  to be explained. 
Another  Possible  Explanation 
I suggest  that  the  concept  of undervaluation  is being  used  in two  different 
senses,  and  that  these  are  associated  with  two different  concepts  of the bal- 
ance  of payments.  In one  sense,  the  dollar  is undervalued  because  its present 
price  is sufficient  to strengthen  not only the net merchandise  balance  but 
the entire  net balance  on goods and services  and perhaps  also the basic 
balance  (that  is, the combined  balance  on goods,  services,  unilateral  trans- 
fers,  and  long-term  capital)  to a degree  that  will bring  one,  two, or all three 
of these  balances  into surplus  in the next  few  years.  It may  be noted  that all 
but one of the foregoing  explanations  of the dollar's  weakness  invoked 
influences  that could  be expected  to be relevant  only over,  at most, two or 
three  years;  the sole exception  is the feared  increase  in imports  of oil and 
gas. 
Probably,  however,  another  factor  is at work.  There  is evidently  a wide- 
spread  belief  that  over  the  longer  future  the dollar  will  be a much  less  secure 
currency  in which  to hold assets  than it was in the past, and that a wise 
investor  should reduce the dollar-denominated  proportion  of his total 
portfolio.  Even  if this belief  were  confined  to foreigners  and  involved  only 
their  dollar-denominated  liquid  assets  and, among  them, only those held 
in the United States,  it would  have affected  assets  totaling  approximately 
$90 billion at the end of March  (nearly  $20 billion held by private  for- 
eigners,  and $70 billion held by foreign  official  agencies).  In addition  to 
these  liquid  liabilities  of the United States,  foreigners  held long-term  and 
nonliquid  short-term  assets  in the United  States  consisting  of some $66  bil- 
lion  at the  end  of 1972,  and  acquired  more  in the first  quarter  of 1973.  They, 
together  with Americans,  also held assets  denominated  in dollars  but lo- 
cated  in other  countries,  which Morgan  Guaranty  estimated  at approxi- 
mately  $95  billion  at the end of March.1  Although  these  are  not liabilities 
1. See World  Financial  Markets,  July 26, 1973, p. 8. According  to this source, these 
estimates  "differ  significantly  from those published  by the Bank  for International  Settle- 
ments  (BIS)  in its recent  annual  report.  The estimates  given here take into account to a 
much  greater  extent than those of the BIS the rapid growth  and proliferation  of Euro- 
currency  banking  outside traditional  European  centers,"  including  Canada,  Japan, the 
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of American residents-at  least not directly-an  effort to sell them would 
weaken the dollar in the foreign exchange market. An attempt by investors 
to substitute other assets for some of the dollar-denominated assets in their 
portfolios would be a transitory phenomenon in the sense that once the 
shift was made, there would be no further attempt to sell dollars; but this 
portfolio adjustment, even if pursued for a relatively long time, would in- 
volve enormous amounts of  money,  since dollar-denominated assets of 
foreigners evidently amount to at least $250 billion. 
Although this hypothesis appears straightforward  enough, further con- 
sideration of it reveals a number of possible motivations for such asset 
shifting. It also reveals some interesting questions, different answers to 
which would have different implications for the exchange value of  the 
dollar. 
First, suppose that there is  a reduction in the desired proportion of 
dollar-denominated  assets but none in the total amount of financial assets 
that people want to  hold;  they want merely to  shift a portion of their 
financial assets denominated in dollars into assets denominated in other 
currencies. That implies a shift out of dollars into other currencies and 
would certainly  tend to lower the price of the dollar in the foreign exchange 
market relative to the desired currencies. 
In contrast to that development, consider, second, a general movement 
out of currencies into  goods in fear of  continued inflation-a  common 
explanation of recent events. The effect of this kind of shift is less clear. 
As was noted in the discussion of gold purchases, the volume of financial 
assets denominated in dollars is larger than the volume denominated in 
any other currency. If all holders of financial assets wanted to reduce their 
holdings by the same proportion and convert them into real assets, there- 
fore, the absolute volume of dollar-denominated assets offered would ex- 
ceed that in any other currency. But this supply would not be offered-at 
least in the first instance-in  the foreign exchange market; it would be 
offered first in the market for real assets. Whether the dollar would be 
weakened by a shift out of financial assets of the same proportion for assets 
denominated in  each  currency evidently depends on  the  currency de- 
manded by the sellers of the real assets, as well as on the currency denomi- 
nation of the financial assets people wish to dispose of. Suppose, to take 
an extreme and hypothetical example, that 60 percent of all financial assets 
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and that all holders wish to reduce their holdings in each currency by the 
same percentage. But suppose also that these would-be sellers want to con- 
vert 75 percent of the assets to be disposed of into real assets owned or cur- 
rently produced by sellers who, whether American or not, want to be paid 
in dollars. Even though a flight from dollar-denominated financial assets 
exceeds in absolute amount the flight from assets in other currencies, it 
could raise the price of dollars in the foreign exchange market because there 
would be a net increase in the demand for dollars, at least initially. 
If the real assets purchased were not currently producible and the sellers 
were content to  hold  dollar-denominated financial assets at their now 
reduced prices, that would be the end of the story. But suppose that the 
initial holders wanted to hold currently producible durable goods-say, 
Cadillacs or metals produced primarily  in the United States-or  invest in 
U.S.  housing developments or office buildings. On a large enough scale, 
such a movement could raise the costs of producing exportable and import- 
competing goods enough to affect the U.S. trade balance adversely. Thus, 
even in this case of a portfolio shift into real assets sold for dollars, the 
initial favorable effect on the foreign exchange value of the dollar might be 
offset. 
There is no need to spell out further complications. The main point is 
that a general flight from financial into real assets would not depress the 
dollar merely because there are more dollar-denominated assets to escape 
from than there are assets in other currencies. The effect on foreign ex- 
change rates depends not only on the relative quantities of financial assets 
denominated in various currencies  that holders wish to dispose of but also, 
in the first instance, on what currencies have to be bought to pay for the 
real assets into which they want to shift. Note  also that the countries of 
residence of the buyers and sellers are relevant only insofar as they influence 
the currencies offered and demanded. 
A  third possible cause of  a shift out  of dollar-denominated financial 
assets relates to holdings of monetary authorities.  Even if a reserve  currency 
were in equilibrium  under a regime of fixed exchange rates, a mere shift to 
a system of floating rates, or even of very flexible rates, would put the dollar 
under pressure if that system were expected to be permanent. Under such 
systems, foreign monetary authorities  presumably  would have a lower stock 
demand for total international reserves, including foreign currencies, than 
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their  dollars  if they  became  convinced  that  the more  flexible  system  was  the 
wave  of the future,  even  if their  previous  holdings  had been  no larger  than 
they wanted.2 
Finally,  some reduction  in the stock demand  for dollars  should  be ex- 
pected  to result  from  the arrangements  among  members  of the European 
Community  to limit the fluctuations  in exchange  rates  between  their  cur- 
rencies.  And a further  reduction  should  result  from  the planned  monetary 
unification  among  the EC members,  to the extent  that  asset  holders  expect 
the plan to be carried  out. The existing  arrangement  to limit  fluctuations 
among  some  of the  members  (France,  Germany,  Belgium-Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands,  and Denmark)  and two nonmembers  (Norway  and Sweden) 
provides  that the  jointness  of their  "joint  float"  should  be maintained  by 
intervention  in their own currencies.  The countries  whose currencies  are 
supported  are supposed  to repay  the supporting  countries  only partly  in 
dollars  and  need  not do so until  the end of the month  following  the month 
of intervention.  The rule  that settlement  is to be only partly  in dollars  has 
been breached  repeatedly,  but future  adherence  to it, in contrast  with the 
earlier  method  of day-to-day  intervention  in dollars,  would  permit  a reduc- 
tion in the  necessary  holdings  of official  reserves  in these  countries  that  may 
not be insignificant.  If it is believed  that unification  is making  progress,  a 
much larger  reduction  in both the official  and private  stock demand  for 
dollars  is likely.  There  are  several  reasons  why  European  monetary  unifica- 
tion may be expected  to have that effect  but limitation  of space  prevents 
discussing  them  here.3 
2. It may also be noted that in any system that permitted  monetary  authorities  to 
intervene  in the foreign exchange  market-the  only kind that can realistically  be con- 
templated-the  U.S. authorities  would probably want larger reserves  of foreign cur- 
rencies  than under  the gold-dollar  system.  Any such addition  to the U.S. stock demand 
for foreign  currencies  would depress  the dollar while the shift occurred.  This, however, 
was probably  not an element  in the weakness  of the dollar  during  the spring  of 1973. 
3. They are  fully discussed  in my paper,  "Implications  for International  Reserves,"  in 
Lawrence  B. Krause and Walter  S. Salant (eds.), European  Monetary Unification  and 
Its Meaning  for the United  States (Brookings  Institution, 1973), especially  pp. 225-27; 
in the comments on that paper by Peter B. Kenen, especially pp. 245-47; and in the 
paper by Richard  N. Cooper, especially  pp. 253-54 and 259-62. While Cooper thinks 
European  monetary  unification  would in itself have no substantial  long-run  effect  on the 
world economy, his qualifications  of that conclusion envisage  a reduction  in the stock 
demand  for dollars,  at least for a number  of years.  See also Cooper's  "The  Future  of the 
Dollar," and the comments on it by Peter M. Oppenheimer,  Pascal Salin, and Motoo 
Kaji, in Foreign  Policy, No. 11 (Summer  1973), pp. 1-32. 
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This hypothesis  of a reduction  in the desired  stock of dollar  assets  does 
not imply  that  the dollar  has ceased  to be the preferred  currency  in which 
to denominate  transactions  or to hold assets. It implies only that the 
strength  of the preference  for dollars  is diminishing.  Such  an implication 
would suffice  to account  for the dollar's  remaining  below the value con- 
sistent  with elimination  of the deficit  in the basic  balance. 
This  conclusion  may  be supported  by some  illustrative  figures.  Suppose, 
for example,  that  foreign  asset  holders  wished  to reduce  the dollar-denomi- 
nated  proportion  of their  liquid  assets  only, and  by only 20 percent  (which 
would be a much smaller  percentage  of their total financial  assets),  and 
were  willing  to do it over  a period  of three  years.  On the assumption  that 
these  assets  amount  to $180  billion,  this would  involve  liquidation  of $12 
billion a year. For the United States  to finance  that outflow  at present 
exchange  rates without  official  intervention  to support  the dollar would 
require  that  its net  balance  of payments  on the official-settlements  definition 
not be in deficit.  This, in turn, would require  the basic balance  to be in 
surplus  by at least  $12  billion  a year,  compared  with  deficits  of $9.8  billion 
in 1972  and of estimated  annual  rates  of $3.8 billion  and $3.1 billion,  re- 
spectively,  in the first  two quarters  of 1973.  Then  a portfolio  adjustment  of 
$12  billion  a year  confined  to foreigners,  and  further  confined  to their  short- 
term  holdings  of dollar  assets,  would  require,  under  a floating  dollar  with 
no intervention  and the consequent  zero official-reserve-transactions  bal- 
ance,  that  the U.S. basic  balance  improve  by about $22  billion  a year  over 
the 1972  figure,  by about  $16  billion  over  the annual  rate  of the  first  quarter 
of 1973,  and by about $15 billion  over  that of the second  quarter.  On the 
assumptions  of this illustrative  case, these figures  overstate  the necessary 
improvement  in that  they  ignore  the growth  of total portfolios  that  may  be 
expected  in a growing  (and inflationary)  world economy,  but they under- 
state  it insofar  as foreigners  also  wish  to reduce  the  proportion  of their  non- 
liquid  dollar  holdings  and  insofar  as U.S. residents  also wish  to reduce  the 
proportion  of their  financial  assets  denominated  in dollars. 
These  figures  are  enough  to indicate  that even  a reduction  in the desired 
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proportion  of dollar-denominated  assets  that was relatively  moderate  and 
that  was  carried  out in equal  amounts  over,  say, three  years,  would  require 
a series  of large  basic  surpluses.  After  this  adjustment  of portfolios  had  been 
accomplished,  such surpluses  would no longer be necessary.  One could 
then  expect  the dollar  to appreciate  and  the main  elements  of the  basic  bal- 
ance to relapse  through  the mechanism  of the strengthened  dollar  toward 
an approximately  even  position,  or to a small  deficit  offset  by an inflow  of 
liquid capital corresponding  to long-run  growth  of portfolios  having a 
stable  currency  composition. 
On  this  view,  the dollar  would  continue  to be weak  for some  time.  While 
it would make a comeback  when these portfolio  adjustments  were com- 
pleted,  that would  take several  years. 
If what  has  been  happening  reflects  such  a change  of views  about  the  long 
run, it is no wonder  that the initial decline  that began in May was not 
counteracted  by short-term  speculative  support.  The apparently  general 
view  that  the dollar  has been  undervalued  may  be correct  in the sense  that 
the dollar  has been cheaper  than it need  be to restore  balance  in the U.S. 
merchandise  trade  account,  goods and services  account,  or basic  balance. 
But even  if this view  is correct-and I believe  it is-it  does not imply  that 
the dollar will rise in the foreign  exchange  market  during  the period in 
which  those deficits  are eliminated. 
Regarding  the  relation  between  the strength  of the dollar  and  the  balance 
of payments,  the improvement  in the U.S. balance  of payments  on the 
official-reserve-transactions  definition  in the second quarter  of 1973 in 
itself has no significance  for the future  strength  of the dollar.  It was not 
only foreseeable  but unavoidable.  Given that the dollar was floating  in 
relation  to most currencies  during  the whole of the second  quarter,  with 
relatively  little  official  intervention,  the  balance  on that  definition  had  to be 
something  between  a small  deficit  and a small  surplus,  depending  on the 
amount  of official  intervention  in the exchange  markets.  (A surplus  oc- 
curred  mainly  because  the Japanese  authorities  sold $2.9  billion  of reserves 
during  the quarter  to prevent  the yen from falling.)  Since  the U.S. deficit 
had  been  enormous  in the first  quarter-an annual  rate  of $42  billion,  sea- 
sonally  adjusted-it could  not have  failed  to improve  in the second  quarter. 
This  improvement  means  merely  that ex post purchases  and sales other 
than by monetary  authorities  were  nearly  equal  in the second  quarter.  It 
did not imply,  therefore,  that the dollar  would  necessarily  strengthen,  al- 
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supply  and demand  forces  have  changed  so as to strengthen  the dollar  re- 
quires  knowing  what  forces  reduced  the first  quarter's  excess  of sales over 
purchases  and their  relative  importance.  Was the change  independent  of 
the May-July  decline  or did it result  from  that decline?  This question  in- 
volves  merely  the rudimentary  distinction  between  increases  in purchases, 
decreases  in sales, or both that result  on the one hand,  from a movement 
of the demand  curve,  the supply  curve,  or both, and, on the other  hand, 
from  movement  along  the existing  curves  when  a price  floor  that has been 
set above  the equilibrium  level is removed.  Since  the floor  under  the dollar 
(and also the ceiling  over  it) was removed  almost  entirely,  there  is no way 
of telling  whether  the previous  excess of sales over purchases  of dollars 
other  than by monetary  authorities  disappeared  because  the demand  and 
supply  curves  moved  or because  the price  was permitted  to fall. 
More  significant  for the future  strength  of the dollar  than  the simple  im- 
provement  of the official-reserve-transactions  balance  is its composition. 
While  by far the largest  part of it stemmed  from termination  of the first 
quarter's  huge  outflow  of liquid  and other  short-term  capital,  an improve- 
ment also occurred  in the basic balance, particularly  in the goods and 
services  component  (see Table 2). This could not have resulted  from the 
decline  of the dollar  during  May, June,  and early  July. 
Also, less  than  half  of the absolute  improvement  in the merchandise  bal- 
ance  since  the fourth  quarter  of 1972  (the  last one unaffected  by the second 
devaluation)  was  attributable  to the  increase  in agricultural  exports  spurred 
by the world grain shortage.  The substantial  increase  in nonagricultural 
exports  and the dampening  of the growth  in imports  suggest  that the de- 
cline in the dollar  that had already  occurred  before  May was having  its 
conventionally  expected  effect,  although  it was  also supported  by the boom 
abroad. 
A Judgment  about  Portfolio  Shifts 
What  I have  said  about  the possibility  that a desire  to readjust  the com- 
position of portfolios  accounts  for the May-July  weakness  of the dollar 
was  intended  to put forward  a hypothesis,  not to express  a commitment  to 
it. My personal  judgment  is that such shifts  are occurring  to some  degree. 
That  view  is strengthened,  as noted above,  by the recently  announced  in- 
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Table  2. Summary  of U.S. International  Transactions,  Selected  Periods, 
1972  and  1973 
Billions of dollars 
Change, 
1972:4 to 
1972  1972:4  1973:1  1973:2  1973:2 
Transaction  Year  (seasonally  adjusted  annual  rates) 
Merchandise  exports,  totala  48.77  52.85  61.28  66.99  14.14 
Agricultural  goods  9.49  10.75  15.28  16.65  5.90 
Nonagricultural  goods  39.28  42.10  46.00  50.34  8.24 
Merchandise  importsa  -55.68  -59.83  -65.12  -67.91  -8.08 
Merchandise  balances  -6.91  -6.98  -3.84  -0.92  6.06 
Services,  total  2.30  3.50  4.44  3.38  -0.11 
Investment  income, netb  7.86  8.93  9.24  8.28  -0.64 
Othere  -5.56  -5.43  -4.80  -4.90  0.53 
Balance  on goods and 
services  -4.61  -3.48  0.60  2.46  5.94 
Remittances,  pensions,  and 
other transfers  -1.57  -1.72  -1.59  -1.52  0.19 
U.S. government  grants, 
excluding  military  -2.17  -1.81  -1.38  -2.20  -0.39 
U.S. government  capital 
flows, net  -1.34  -2.34  -1.34  0.38  2.72 
Private  long-term  capital 
flows, net  -0.15  3.12  -0.08  -2.25  -5.37 
Balance  on current  account 
and  long-term  capital  -9.84  -6.22  -3.79  -3.13  3.10 
Nonliquid private  short- 
term  capital flows, net  -1.64  -3.93  -7.17  -4.22  -0.29 
Allocations  of special 
drawing  rights  0.71  0.71  0  0  -0.71 
Errors  and omissions,  net  -3.11  -5.96  -15.68  0.92  6.88 
Liquid  private  capital 
flows, net  3.54  9.47  -15.35  7.93  -1.54 
Balance  on official  reserve 
transactions  -10.34  -5.94  -42.00  1.50  7.44 
Means of financing 
Decrease  in official 
reserve  assets  0.03  -0.44  0.88  0.07  0.51 
Increase  in liabilities  to 
foreign official  agencies  10.31  6.38  41.12  -1.57  -7.95 
Source: Survey of Current  Business, Vol. 53 (September 1973), Tables BI and 1, pp. 38, 41. Component 
figures may not add exactly to totals because of rounding. 
a. Excludes exports under U.S. military agency sales contracts and imports of U.S. military agencies. 
b. Includes fees and royalties received and paid on direct investment. 
c.  Includes military transactions. Walter S. Salant  495 
of $273 million in foreign  exchange  to support  the dollar  and that these 
efforts  were  "strongly  reinforced  by coordinated  Bundesbank  purchases  ... 
totaling  somewhat  more  than $300  million."4  That  intervention  shows  that 
autonomous  changes  in private  supply and demand  conditions  did not 
alone  end the decline  of the dollar  in July and cause  the partial  recovery 
since  then. Furthermore,  they did not do so with the unsupported  help of 
private  responses  to the narrowing  of differences  in interest  rates  between 
the United  States  and Germany,  although  those must  have been a factor. 
Some adjustment  of portfolios  is probably  inevitable,  for there  is little 
doubt that the relative  economic  and political  dominance  of the United 
States  in the world  has diminished.  In this sense,  those  who think  that the 
long-run  shrinkage  of U.S. hegemony  suffices  to explain  the deterioration 
in the price  of the dollar  are  probably  right,  even  though  they  almost  never 
establish  the connection  between  this generalized  cause  and the mundane 
movements  in the foreign  exchange  market.  Because  general  recognition  of 
this  long-run  change  appears  to back  up projections  of past  losses  by hold- 
ers  of dollars,  I assume  that  a desire  to make  long-term  shifts  out of dollars 
is a force  now at work. 
Nevertheless,  I also doubt  that decisions  involving  massive amounts  of 
dollars  have  been  irrevocably  taken.  It is far  from  clear  (to me, at least)  that 
the decrease  in U.S. power  will be great  enough  to induce  a massive  long- 
run  reduction  in the proportion  of assets  held  in dollars.  What  currencies, 
after  all, are  long-run  competitors?  I doubt  that  any single  country  outside 
the communist  bloc will succeed  to a predominant  position in the near 
future.  The United States  still provides  the most competitive  capital  and 
financial  markets,  and  that fact contributed  to the demand  for dollars  as a 
currency  in which to conduct  transactions  and to hold wealth  in liquid 
forms.  This advantage  was gravely  damaged  by the second  traumatic  de- 
valuation,  but probably  can be largely,  if not wholly, regained  in time. 
Although  some regard  Germany  as a strong  candidate,  an equally  likely 
competitor,  in my view, is an aggregation  of countries-the European 
Community  led by Germany;  but the conflicts  within  the community  and 
the continental  dislike of keen competition  among financial  institutions 
make  it doubtful  that any of its currencies,  including  the still hypothetical 
4. See Charles  A. Coombs,  "Treasury  and Federal  Reserve  Foreign  Exchange  Opera- 
tions," Federal  Reserve  Bank of New York, Monthly  Review,  Vol. 55 (September  1973), 
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unified  community  currency,  will succeed  to the position  formerly  held  by 
the dollar. 
I conclude,  therefore,  that although  some shifting  out of dollars  is in- 
evitable,  the size of the shifts still hangs  in the balance,  and will depend 
heavily  on unfolding  events, including  policy decisions  by the U.S. au- 
thorities. 
Discussion 
LAWRENCE  KRAUSE  EXPRESSED doubts that the experts  were agreed  in 
February  1973  that  the dollar  was  undervalued.  Nor did he believe  that  the 
case for such a verdict  had been compelling.  Enormous  uncertainties  sur- 
round  any estimates  of the long-run  equilibrium  value of the dollar.  The 
exchange  markets  in recent  months  have  reflected  these  uncertainties;  and 
Krause  thought  that  it was  very  difficult  to second-guess  the market.  While 
Franco  Modigliani  agreed  with  Krause  that the exchange  market  provides 
a measure  of the "warranted  change"  in a currency's  valuation,  he under- 
lined the possibility  of destabilizing  speculation  in the short run. He felt 
that  the sharpness  both of the decline  in the dollar's  value  during  the spring 
and of its subsequent  rebound  implied  that such forces  had been at work. 
He pointed  to the desirability  of intervention  by central  banks  in exchange 
markets  to contain  the impact  of such  speculation  in the future.  Modigliani 
felt that a limited  amount  of such  intervention  could  help  a system  of float- 
ing exchange  rates  work  more effectively. 
William  Branson  expressed  basic  agreement  with Salant's  views  on port- 
folio shifts. It seemed  quite plausible  that world traders  would want to 
diversify  their  portfolios  into a wider  range  of currencies  because  of greater 
uncertainty  about exchange  rates. But he was skeptical  that such adjust- 
ments would take anywhere  near the three years Salant  implied,  in view 
of earlier  studies  of his own that had found  fairly  short  lags in the flow of 
liquid capital.  Alan Greenspan  added  that portfolio  adjustments  may al- 
ready  have passed  their  peak as an influence  on exchange  rates.  Much of 
the overhang  had been created  through  massive  intervention  by central 
banks  acting  to support  the dollar  in the past.  He felt it was  important  that 
such  mistakes  not be repeated  in the event  of some  temporary  weakness  of 
the dollar  in the future.  Barring  such  mistakes,  he felt the worst  might  well 
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Modigliani  pointed out that any expected  appreciation  of the dollar 
would add to the total expected  return  from dollar  holding,  thus slowing 
down  the dishoarding  of dollars.  He and Fred  Bergsten  stressed  the possi- 
bility of consolidating  excess dollar holdings  (for example,  in the Inter- 
national  Monetary  Fund) as a way of both containing  downward  pres- 
sures  on the dollar  and increasing  stability  in exchange  markets. 
Several  participants  mentioned  other  factors  that might  operate  to hold 
down  the international  value  of the dollar.  Branson  noted  that a decline  in 
U.S. interest  rates  relative  to those abroad  could  have  important  effects  in 
that direction  during  the months  ahead.  David  Fand suggested  that expec- 
tations  that U.S. investment  controls  might  be relaxed  and that American 
citizens  might  be allowed  to hold gold could be exerting  downward  pres- 
sure  on the dollar's  exchange  rate.  Bergsten  stressed  the great  and  growing 
competition  of the deutsche  mark  with the dollar  as a major  transactions 
and  reserve  currency.  He noted  that the mark  had surpassed  sterling  as the 
second  leading  reserve  currency  and now absorbed  over one-fourth  of the 
transactions  in the Eurocurrency  market.  Moreover,  German  exports  now 
exceed  U.S. exports.  He concluded  that the mark  was a "dominant  new 
force"  in international  finance,  and that shifts into it were  likely to gen- 
erate  continuing  downward  pressure  on the dollar. 
A number  of participants  commented  on the relationship  between  ex- 
change  rates  and domestic  inflation.  William  Poole wondered  whether  ex- 
change  markets  were  reflecting  a belief abroad  that, in view of its record 
since  the mid-sixties,  the  United  States  is unlikely  to contain  inflation  in the 
years  ahead.  Modigliani  and Branson  emphasized  that the United States 
has not been more inflationary  than its trading  partners,  although, as 
William  Fellner  pointed  out, U.S. export prices  have risen more rapidly 
than those of Germany  and Japan.  Murray  Weidenbaum  suggested  that 
inflation  might be more tolerable  to the public  in countries  with rapidly 
rising  real  incomes  than it was in mature  countries  like the United States. 
He felt that a growing  reaction  against  inflation  has recently  been  revealed 
in the political  process  and  that  that  reaction  might  exert  more  influence  on 
U.S. policies  in the future. 